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NOTES AND COMMENTS
-would be regarded by the Federal Courts as having any effect, in as
:nuch as such procedure would hamper banking relations.
22
V HARRY W. MCGALLIARD.
I)amages-Unauthorized Disclosure of Telegram as Basis
,of Punitive Damages.
The plaintiff sued for the wrongful disclosure of the contents of
a telegram from his divorced wife. The disclosure was made to the
-plaintiff's fiance by one of the defendant's employees who had
-erroneously concluded from the message that the plaintiff was still
married. Although the fiancee then knew of the previous marriage
and divorce, she immediately broke off the engagement. The plain-
tiff's recovery was limited to nominal damages. Held, a corporate
employer is not liable for punitive damages without having par-
ticipated in or ratified his servant's act.'
In actions ex delicto where the tortious conduct was character-
ized by malice or wantonness, exemplary damages are discretionary
with the jury.2 As in the principal case, the wantonness may take
the form of a reckless disregard for another's rights.3 Verdicts in
,excess of the plaintiff's actual loss are the exception rather than the
rUle.
4
Concerning the liability of employers for exemplary damages, in
most jurisdictions the practice prevails of limiting an individual em-
ployer's liability to those acts of his servant in which he has himself
participated.5 Judicial opinion is rather evenly divided on the ques-
tion of the liability of corporate -employers.6 The federal courts and
' Allied Mill v. Horton, supra note 1, at 710. The court states with ref-
•erence to the stipulation accompanying the draft, supra note 3: "If each time
-such a draft is collected the collecting. bank under such notice is required to
.place the specific funds received in a safe deposit box or in a package for the
drawer, the transaction of business through drafts . . . would be quite
revolutionized."
'Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Aldridge, 66 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 9th,
1933).
'Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 13
Sup. Ct. 261, 37 L. ed. 97 (1893). Contra: Boott Mills Co. v. Boston & Maine
R. Co., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N. E. 680 (1914) (Louisiana, Nevada, and Washing-
-ton follow Massachusetts in rejecting the doctrine of exemplary damages com-
pletely).
'Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 519, 6
Atl. 545 (1886).
' Cock v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 84 Miss. 380, 36 So. 392 (1904).
'Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 14 Atl. 488 (1888).
McCormick, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rv.
129, 132.
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many states have extended to corporations the treatment accorded
individual employers.7 A great number of jurisdictions, however,
adhere to the contrary rule of unrestricted liability by which, if an
employee's wrongful act is such as to render him liable for exem-
plary damages and his corporate employer for compensatory dam-
ages, the latter may be held for the exemplary damages as well.8 The
adherents of this rule hold that, because of the pecuniary irresponsi-
bility of employees who are placed in positions of trust for the benefit
of the corporations, unrestricted liability is a social necessity which
justifies the lenient interpretation of the requirement of malice as a
basis for the recovery of punitive damages.0
In the federal courts, where the question of exemplary damages is
considered a matter of general jurisprudence and decided in accord-
ance with the federal rule,' 0 to recover such damages the plaintiff
must show that the corporate employer was privy to the misconduct. 11
This connection may be established by proof of specific or general
authorization,' 2 actual participation through a company executive,18
employment or retention of an employee of known incompetence or
recklessness,' 4 or subsequent ratification of the wrong.15
An addressee may sue a telegraph company in tort for a breach
of its public duty, such as an unauthorized disclosure. 16 Thus, the
nominal award of $1 compensatory damages in the principal case
does not appear to represent fully the plaintiff's actual injury. It is
true that he cannot 'recover for the loss of the engagement. The in-
terest of the parties to a marriage engagement is not protected against
its rupture by third persons,' 7 regardless of the aggravated nature of
the circumstances.' 8 In addition, the fianc&ees admission of prior
" Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Prentice, supra note 2;
Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 120 Pac. 771 (1911); Marlatt v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 167 Wis. 176, 167 N. W. 263 (1918).
'Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202 (1869); Peterson v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 75 Minn. 368, 77 N. W. 985 (1899).
'Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., supra note 8.
"Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Prentice, supra note 2.
"Ibid.
' Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct. 1286, 30
L. ed. 1146 (1887).
3Ibid.
" Cleghorn v. N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 15 Am.
Rep. 375 (1874).
"Forrester v. Southern Pacific Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 Pac. 753 (1913).
"Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cowin & Co., 20 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927).
"Homan v. Hall, 102 Neb. 70, 165 N. W. 881 (1917).
'Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, 144 N. W. 1089 (1915) (plaintiff's fianc~e
seduced).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
knowledge of the plaintiff's first marriage tends to show that the
breach did not result proximately from the disclosure. But the dis-
closure itself was a clear invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy
in his communications with others.19 In an analogous class of cases
dealing with the tapping of telephone wires, substantial compensatory
damages are recoverable, even where there is no injurious use of the
information obtained. 2° If the right of privacy in communications
is to receive the protection which its importance to the individual
merits, it would seem that the courts should assess substantial dam-
ages upon those who violate it.
ERVID ERIC ERICSON.
Declaratory Judgments-Recent Trends.
Plaintiff sued in the New York state courts for an injunction to
restrain the sale of reclassified stock of defendant corporation and
for a declaratory judgment as to the rights of preferred stockholders
under the Delaware reclassification statute. The cause was removed
to the Federal District Court in New York, the injunction denied,
and the complaint dismissed without prejudice to any rights plaintiff
might have in the matter. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the denial of an injunction, but held it was error to dismiss
the application for a declaratory judgment.1
In three leading cases, 2 the Supreme Court of the United States
uttered dicta, criticized as unwarranted and inappropriate,3 to the
effect that the requirements of a case or controversy under Article
III of thd Constitution prevented declaratory judgments in the Fed-
eral Courts, originally or by removal. These dicta were followed in
subsequent cases. 4 Recently, by a unanimous opinion in Nashville,
Green, The Right of Privacy (1932) 27 ILL. L. Ray. 237, 252.
'Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931) commented
on (1932) 11 Oma. L. Rav. 217.
1Harr et. al. v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933).
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71 L. ed.
541 (1927); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op. Ass'n.,
276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 72 L. ed. 473 (1928); Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n., 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 72 L. ed. 880 (1928).
'Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment (1928) 14
A. B. A. J. 633, 635.
'State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U. S. 423, 51 Sup. Ct. 522, 75
L. ed. 1154 (1931) ; Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) ;
Marty v. Nagle, 44 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) ; City of Osceola, Iowa v.
Utilities Holding Corp., 55 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Chicago Bank
of Commerce v. McPherson, 62 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932.)
